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1. Introduction 
 
Foreign Aid in developing economies has become an indispensable source of financing 
economic growth and development. The narrow fiscal space and low levels of foreign 
exchange earnings imply less financing for infrastructure and social sector development. 
Successful aid experiences suggest countries achieving higher human capital growth, faster 
capital accumulation and improved welfare levels (Chowdhury and Garonna 2007). 
Critics of existing aid regime have highlighted negative implications of foreign aid which in 
many countries gets diverted to non-development expenditures and servicing of debt 
overhang. Furthermore, political instability, frequent changes in policies, misaligned public 
sector priorities and inefficiency of institutions neutralizes the effect of aid on growth thereby 
having less than expected impact on poverty reduction. The study on sources of 
ineffectiveness of aid has occupied substantial attention in the recent literature and explains 
the slow progress towards millennium development goals (MDGs).  
Pack and Pack (1993) argued aid ineffectiveness in developing countries is because of 
diversion of aid from development to deficit financing (which is largely owed to rising 
current expenditures) and debt servicing. Burnside and Dollar (2000) find the positive impact 
of aid in developing countries in presence of prudent polices. However Easterly et al. (2003), 
find no support that aid works well under good policy environment.  Chong et al. (2009) 
show significant effect of aid on inequality and poverty reduction. Furthermore they suggest 
that good institutions may be necessary for aid to reach the poor. When studied for specific 
indicators Masud and Yontcheva (2005) show that NGO aid reduces infant mortality more 
effectively than official bilateral aid.  
In case of Pakistan two-gap framework might justify the need of foreign assistance (Saeed 
2005). Like most developing countries Pakistan’s domestic resource mobilization is not 
sufficient to overcome the rising government expenditures which have recently also 
ballooned due to the financing of war on terror and destruction due to devastating flash 
floods.  In order to keep growth momentum going during times of conflict requires 
multisectoral foreign assistance. Upon independence in1947 the country inherited obsolete or 
minimal infrastructure in most productive sectors leading to Pakistan approaching the donors 
relatively early in history. Pakistan’s association with for example the World Bank (WB) 
goes back to 1950. The WB has been the largest provider of development assistance to 
Pakistan. Between 1952 and 2006, WB has approved 266 financing arrangements for 
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Pakistan, totalling more than US$15.7 billion, of which about US$9 billion remains 
outstanding.    
In 1960 the WB organized the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium to facilitate coordination among 
the major providers of international assistance. The consortium's members included the 
United States (US), Canada, Japan, Britain, Germany, France, and organizations such as the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB). Most non-consortium funding came from Saudi Arabia and 
other oil-producing Middle Eastern countries. The US has been a major provider of aid since 
independence and was the largest donor until the 1980s.   
It can be observed in Pakistan’s history that periods of intense conflict were not followed by 
sustainable growth. Due to which macroeconomic situation remained fragile. Since 1988, 
almost eleven loan arrangements (including the recent $7.6 billion in 2008) have taken place 
under various IMF programmes. Almost six loan arrangements were made during the regimes 
of Pakistan People Party including Standby Arrangement, Structural Adjustment Programs, 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and Extended Structural Adjustment 
Programme. Two IMF loan arrangements were made during Pakistan Muslim League regime 
and two Standby Agreements and PRGF were contracted under military regime (post 1999) 
to stabilize the economy. There is a significant difference between the loans promised and 
disbursed under the above mentioned arrangements because national governments were 
unable to fulfil the stringent conditionalities.  Later between 2001 and 2005 Pakistan 
successfully implemented two IMF-supported programs. 
In 2010 WB approved a lending facility of $6.2 billion for four years focusing on specific 
areas such as energy management and development, revenue generation and aid to terror-
stricken areas. In energy, WB plans to assist the government in making power sector more 
efficient by optimally harnessing the potential of hydropower sector. The natural gas system 
will also receive much awaited attention, which presently suffers from higher costs of 
leakages owning to dilapidated operations management. This arrangement comes at an apt 
time when the productive sectors are suffering from power shortages and the input costs of 
industry particularly small and medium enterprises (SME) have led to substantial business 
closures.  
The earthquake of 2005 and destruction in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province due to war on 
terror has led to mass suffering in the region. The WB along with other donors are aiming for 
intervention in health and education. The overall strategy focuses on putting Pakistan back on 
4 
 
a broad-based pro-poor growth path which ultimately creates employment and reduces 
poverty. One of the cornerstones of macroeconomic framework will be increasing the tax to 
GDP ratio which currently ranks one of the lowest in the world. It is essential that value 
added tax (VAT) reforms are undertaken at the earliest which can form a basis for longer 
term requirements of human capital and related social sectors. These reforms which also 
intend to focus on broad basing of tax regime will also reduce reliance on foreign aid.  
In this paper we study the link between aid, development and security. The next section 
describes briefly the role of aid in Pakistan economy, including a review on how aid is 
motivated by geopolitics and security concerns. Section 3 provides results from a linked 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) – microsimulation model where we simulate an 
increase in foreign savings and see its macro – micro impact. Section 4 brings together the 
current aid regime in Pakistan and how effective it is in the provision of services and 
infrastructure. We then discuss some key aid experiences of Pakistan with respect to specific 
programmes initiated during different phases of country’s history. The last section before we 
conclude, provides a checklist of priorities for aid policy reform in Pakistan.  
2. Aid, Security and Development  
 
 
a. Role of Aid in Pakistan Economy 
 
Pakistan economy has grown at an average growth rate of 5 percent between 2001 and 2010. 
This period saw the doubling of merchandise exports and remittances from abroad while 
imports more than doubled.  For most part of the decade the improved fiscal discipline helped 
maintain a high poverty related government expenditure. However in the wake of food, fuel 
and financial crisis, the economy saw decline in aid and FDI inflows (see Ahmed and O’ 
Donoghue 2010). The size of external debt and liabilities ballooned and due to the hike in 
inflation and deteriorating exchange rate, high inflation after 2007 eroded the gains made 
towards poverty reduction (Table 1). With dwindling foreign exchange reserves, Pakistan 
resorted to IMF standby arrangement and gradually moved towards a recovery phase during 
2008-09. However in 2010 the economy was also hit by a domestic energy crisis, where 
inter-corporate debt crippled the energy sector and led to electricity and gas shortages for 
commercial purposes as well as households. With some recovery in large scale 
5 
 
manufacturing the growth in 2009-10 crossed 4 percent and exports remained robust despite 
the looming global recession. The devastating flash floods of September 2010 destroyed $ 9 
billion worth of infrastructure, in turn putting downward pressure on economic growth and 
increasing Pakistan’s expectation from donors for higher level of aid.  
 
Table 1 Pakistan - Macroeconomic Situation 2001 - 2010 
Indicators 2001 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010* 
GDP growth (%) 2.0 9.0 5.8 6.8 1.2 4.1 
Merchandise Exports (US $ billion) 9.2 14.4 16.4 17.1 18.9 19.6 
Merchandise Imports (US $ billion) 10.7 20.6 28.6 26.6 31.4 30.5 
FDI (US $ billion)  1.5 3.5 5.1 3.7 2.2 
Remittances (US $ billion)  4.2 4.6 5.5 7.8 8.9 
External debt and liabilities (US $ billion)  34.0 35.9 39.0 50.7 52.7 
Poverty headcount ratio 34.5 23.9 22.3  35  
Poverty related expenditure (US $ billion)  5.3 6.3 7.0 3.8  
Exchange Rate 58.4 59.4 59.9 60.6 78.5 83.6 
*Provisional estimates 
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan, State Bank of Pakistan - Annual Report 
 
The history of foreign borrowing in Pakistan goes back to 1950s. The major chunk of aid has 
come under project assistance which in most cases was tied to source and utilization. The 
initialization process of project assistance also required participation by the government. The 
second most important type of aid to Pakistan was in the form of commodity assistance. 
Various governments preferred this type of inflows as these were not tied to utilization. 
However Saeed (2005) indicates that commodity assistance to Pakistan as a ratio of total aid 
had decreased from 34 percent in 1965 to 23 percent by 1980.  With in this category Pakistan 
also received food aid which initially included wheat and edible oils from US government. 
Finally technical cooperation remained high on Pakistan’s agenda as this allowed technical 
help from sectoral experts as well as training of officials abroad. Brecher and Abbas (1972) 
provide an analysis of early period when Pakistan received $3.5 billion in assistance from US 
over 15 years (1952 – 67). Out of this amount loans accounted for 38 percent, food aid was 
37 percent and other grants constituted 25 percent. The majority of aid was concentrated in 
industrial commodities power, irrigation and transport sectors. 
Rahim and Khan (1993) found an inconclusive relationship between aid, savings and 
economic growth. There is negative coefficient between aid and domestic resource 
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mobilisation. However aid plays a definite role in determining overall savings behaviour in 
Pakistan. Khan (1997) taking account of falling concessional aid as percentage of total, 
higher overtime average interest rates, falling maturity periods and lower grant element, 
argues that aid has a negative casual impact on GDP and aid has negative impact on 
economic growth after controlling the supply side shocks. The harsher terms of aid made it 
all the more difficult to retire debt in the medium to long run. The factors identified for 
ineffectiveness of aid include project selection biases towards poorly identified and large 
projects, foreign exchange intensive development programmes, longer gestation 
infrastructure rather than productive projects, lack of government-donor and intra-donor 
coordination.   
Iqbal (1997) discovered that foreign capital flows channelled through the public sector have a 
strong positive impact on social and non-development expenditures. However, foreign aid 
has little effect on development expenditure. The non-development expenditure has strong 
interdependence with social sector expenditures. Furthermore foreign assistance increases 
potential of tax revenue generation.  Ghulam (2005), found the positive impact of ODA on 
economic growth. As the flow of foreign capital increases, GDP increases at a decreasing 
rate. However rising aid flows substituted for domestic savings ultimately increasing the debt 
burden. Ishfaq (2004) explains that foreign aid, though in a limited manner, has assisted 
poverty reduction in Pakistan. Vos (1998) suggests that aid flows tend to generate strong 
dutch disease effects in case of Pakistan.  
 
 
Figure 
 
Figure 1 shows the outstanding debt stock
domestic borrowing increased much faster than
2008. Whether or not the rising debt stock is good for the country largely depends upon how 
these borrowings are spent. If government fails to 
investment (which in turn provides enabling infrastructure and facilitation to the privat
sector) there is a possibility that the country ends up embracing a debt trap situation which 
also brings with it a Dutch disease phenomenon
increased substantially, primarily due to
war on terror. At the same time Pakistan
business environment in the country
revenue generation (Table 2). 
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Table 2 Pakistan Tax to GDP ratio 
Year Tax to GDP Ratio 
2003 11.4 
2004 10.8 
2005 10.1 
2006 10.5 
2007 10.3 
2008 10.3 
2009 9.5 
     Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 
 
Husain (1992) highlighted Pakistan economy’s repeated reliance on foreign savings for 
bridging the gap between domestic savings and investment. However the rising debt burden 
of Pakistan3 required a gradual shift away from this persistent reliance on foreign resources. 
In order to avoid the debt crisis the author suggested a strategy where emphasis should be on 
increasing domestic saving rates, export receipts, foreign investment and a reflow of foreign 
assets held by Pakistanis abroad. Husain (1999) explains that a major change in Pakistan’s 
debt profile was when the composition of external financing changed from bilateral grants 
and concessional lending towards multilateral and non-concessional flows. The percentage of 
grant in total assistance declined from 77 percent in 1960 to 9.6 percent during late 1990s 
(Table 3).  Baqai (1973) while discussing the dominant role of foreign aid in Pakistan’s 
earlier plans, explains that choice is not yet open to developing countries to adopt a 
development strategy based on aid flows (which Pakistan actually did in Second five year 
development Plan). The developed countries are unwilling to provide assistance on such a 
scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
3
 Average debt to export ratio between 1986 – 90 was 241.5 percent and average debt to GNP ratio during the 
same period was 48.4 percent.  
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Table 3 Pakistan-Decade-wise Loans and Grants Disbursed ($ Million) 
Year Loan  Grants Total % of 
Grant 
in Total 
1. Upto 30-06-1960 192 650 842 77.2 
II. 2nd Plan (1961-65) 1232 1162 2394 48.5 
III. 3rd Plan (1966-70) 2324 719 3043 23.6 
IV. Non-Plan (1971-78) 5083 634 5717 11.1 
V. 5th Plan (1979-83) 4418 1375 5793 23.7 
VI. 6th Plan(1984-88) 5158 2025 7183 28.2 
VII. 7th Plan (1989-93) 9540 2541 12081 21.0 
VIII. 8th Plan (1994-98) 11522 1226 12748 9.6 
IX. 1999-2007 12824 5380 18204 29.6 
Grand Total 52293 15712 68005 23.1 
Source: Economic Affairs Division 
 
The rate of interest remained relatively low during 1960s to 1970s (Table 4). During 1970s 
and most part of 1980s grants constituted around 35 to 50 percent of external financing 
requirements. However by 1995 this ratio was down to 5 percent. The main factors 
responsible for this were frequent change in political orientations and ‘donor fatigue’ leading 
to increase in debt servicing costs during 1990s. By 1995 most of the debt as part of official 
financing was being channelled through international financial institutions and bilateral debt 
only accounted for less than 35 percent. Out of the total debt stock around 80 percent was for 
financing of longer term projects and commodity aid and the remainder was credits by banks 
and IMF.   
Table 4 Term Structure of Loans 
Period Interest 
% 
Payment 
(Years) 
Grace 
period 
(Years) 
1950s 4.6 21 2 
1960s 3.3 30 7 
1970s 3.6 25 6 
1980s 4.8 28 7 
1990s 4.4 21 6 
2005-09 1.3 25.1 - 
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 
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Ahmed and Amjad (1984) discuss that most aid to Pakistan was tied to source and utilization, 
ultimately resulting in Pakistan purchasing desired goods and services on credit and at 
uncompetitive prices. The interest rates in most cases were equal to the commercial rates (see 
also Hamid 1970, Alavi and Khusro 1970).  
Pakistan managed to keep a sound current account balance during early phase of this decade. 
However one can observe a recent jump in external debt to GDP ratio from 27 percent in 
2007 to 30.4 percent in 2010. The key contributors to this increase are IMF Standby 
Arrangement and multilateral loans (Table 5).  While the contribution of Paris club only 
increased by $ 1 billion during 2005 to 2010, the contribution of multilaterals went up from $ 
15.4 billion in 2005 to 23.2 billion in 2010. In the Paris Club group, Pakistan has contracted 
loans and signed grant agreements with Canada, Japan, UK and USA in 2009. In the non-
Paris Club group Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and China are the main donors. In multilaterals the 
main sources were ADB, EU and IDA. In mid 1990s when public debt to GDP ratio was 
hovering around 87 percent with a higher share of external debt, Pasha and Ghaus (1996) 
explained that the key fiscal management goal in Pakistan should be to keep primary budget 
deficit at a level which prevents the public debt to income ratio from rising.  
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Table 5 External Debt and Liabilities 2005 – 2010 ($ billion) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010* 
1.   Public and Publically Generated Debt 31.1 32.8 35.3 40.2 42.2 42.4 
            A. Medium and Long Term (>1 year) 30.8 32.6 35.3 39.5 41.6 41.8 
                     Paris Club 13.0 12.8 12.7 13.9 14.0 14.0 
                     Multilateral  15.4 16.8 18.7 21.6 23.1 23.2 
                    Other Bilateral  0.8 0.8 1.0 1.2 2.0 2.5 
                    Euro / Other Bonds 1.3 1.9 2.7 2.7 2.2 1.6 
                    Military Debt 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 
                    Commercial Loans/Credits 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 
           B. Short Term (<1 year) 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.7 0.6 
                     IDB 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.7 0.6 
2. Private Non-Guaranteed Debt (>1 year) 1.3 1.6 2.3 2.9 3.3 3.2 
3. IMF 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 5.1 7.2 
of which        Central Govt.      1.1 
                   Monetary Authorities 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 5.1 6.1 
Total External Debt (1 through 3) 34.0 35.9 39.0 44.5 50.7 52.7 
(of Which)        Public Debt 31.1 32.8 35.3 40.2 42.2 43.5 
4. Foreign Exchange Liabilities 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.7 1.3 1.2 
Total External Debt and Liabilities (1 
through 4) 
35.4 37.2 40.3 46.2 52.0 53.9 
(of Which)        Public Debt 32.1 33.8 36.5 40.7 42.2 43.5 
Official Liquid Reserves 9.8 10.8 13.3 8.7 9.5 11.2 
 (In percentage of GDP) 
Total External debt (1 through 3) 31.1 28.2 27.3 27.0 31.3 30.4 
1. Public and Publically Guaranteed Debt 28.4 25.8 24.7 24.5 26.0 24.4 
          A. Medium and Long Term (>1 year) 28.1 25.6 24.7 24.0 25.6 24.1 
          B. Short Term (<1 year) 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.3 
3. IMF 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.8 3.2 4.1 
4. Foreign Exchange Liabilities 1.3 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.7 
Total External Debt and Liabilities (1 
through 4) 
32.3 29.2 28.2 28.1 32.0 31.1 
*Data up to March 2009-10.  
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 
 
For functional use if we bifurcate aid into project aid and non-project aid. Food, non food, 
relief and balance of payment aid constitute non-project aid.  The project aid almost equalled 
the non-project aid in the earlier phases of economic history of Pakistan (Table 6) however 
project aid increased much faster from 5th to 8th Plan period. After which increased Balance 
of payment (BoP) support led to an increase in the non-project aid component.  
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Table 6 Project and Non-Project Aid Disbursed ($ Million) 
 
Project 
aid 
Non-
food 
aid 
Food 
aid 
BOP 
support/ 
cash 
receipts 
Others 
Aid 
Total 
non-project 
aid 
Total 
disbursement 
 1 2 3 4 5 6=(2+3+4+5) 7=(1+6) 
Upto 30-06-1960 406 244 192 -- 0 436 842 
2nd Plan (1961-65) 1209 420 765 -- 0 1185 2394 
3rd Plan (1966-70) 1811 763 469 -- 0 1232 3043 
Non-Plan (1971-78) 2543 1299 785 1090 0 3174 5717 
5th Plan (1979-83) 3363 950 306 531 643 2430 5793 
6th Plan(1984-88) 4882 791 776 -- 734 2301 7183 
7th Plan (1989-93) 7643 1922 1558 413 545 4438 12081 
8th Plan (1994-98) 9564 61 1923 1139 61 3184 12748 
1999-2009 13269 255 538 16129 51 16973 30242 
Total 44691 6707 7315 19306 2039 35353 80043 
Source: Economic Affairs Division 
 
Table 7 shows the disbursement of project aid in different sectors of the economy between 
2000 and 2009. The sectors that have received the highest foreign assistance include power, 
water, transport and communication and rural development. However it seems that Pakistan 
has received low levels of aid for development of science and technology, human resource 
development and information technology. These neglected areas are critical for sustaining 
short term growth spurts in developing countries. 
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Table 7 Sector – wise Disbursement of Project Aid ($ Million) 
Sectors 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Agriculture 68.5 37.7 44.3 10.9 17.7 9.0 19.2 26.0 27.3 32.2 292.8 
Education & Training 102.7 74.6 60.4 43.1 57.2 46.2 93.0 111.3 54.3 84.2 727.0 
Environment 13.1 8.8 14.7 3.1 11.7 7.2 6.2 15.5 9.9 7.2 97.3 
Fuel 164.1 14.9 1.5 0.0 1.5 51.0 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 234.0 
Governance, Research & 
Statistics 
17.5 41.3 29.4 29.6 35.3 82.7 85.1 84.4 54.9 77.5 537.7 
Health & Nutrition 31.2 22.2 14.9 59.8 52.4 78.7 54.3 47.2 51.1 31.0 442.9 
Industry & Production 6.6 5.3  2.2 0.5 6.7 3.0 7.9 1.0 6.6 38.3 
Information Technology 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Manpower, Employment 
& HRD 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.4 0.1 0.0 2.8 
Physical Planning & 
Housing 
65.2 31.3 29.0 27.9 37.3 32.5 46.0 51.8 34.5 29.5 385.1 
Population Welfare 63.4 5.4 5.8 9.1 5.9 17.6 27.2 27.1 15.6 56.4 233.6 
Power 211.7 303.9 176.6 250.6 112.4 59.2 143.6 119.0 116.4 208.3 1702 
Rural Development & 
Poverty Reduction 
23.0 35.2 45.8 63.3 50.2 228.8 272.8 97.9 83.3 111.0 1011 
Science & Technology 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 
Social Welfare 200.8 188.8 92.3 79.6 7.5 15.1 9.2 20.0 20.3 14.3 647.8 
Transport & 
Communication 
172.8 152.0 110.9 184.1 129.0 136.7 159.8 197.7 234.9 311.5 1789 
Water 121.7 106.8 114.0 68.6 94.6 143.7 121.9 113.4 44.1 91.1 1020 
Women Development 0.2 1.3 3.0 13.5 8.4 2.6 0.7 2.6 1.8 1.9 35.9 
Total 1263 1030 741.2 845.8 622.4 917.7 1045 922.4 749.2 1063 9199 
Source: Economic Affairs Division 
 
Extracting rankings from disbursements shown in Table 7, we see the sectoral preference of 
donors kept changing between 2000 and 2009. The power sector that ranked first in 2000 had 
slided to second in 2009 when the priority sector now was transport and communication. The 
increased focus on rural development and education was seen only recent in 2009. Both 
sectors were not amongst the top 5 in 2000 ( 
Table 8). 
 
Table 8 Top 5 Sectoral Disbursements 2000 and 2009 
Rank 2000 2009 
1 Power Transport and Communication 
2 Social welfare Power 
3 Transport and communication Rural Development and Poverty Reduction 
4 Fuel Water 
5 Water Education and Training 
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b. Foreign Assistance and Regional Security 
 
The link between aid and security and how both impact service delivery, poverty and welfare 
indicators has received substantial attention in the literature. The work done by DAC Fragile 
States Group Secretariat requires special mention here. DAC (2008) provides understanding 
of mutual influence of security and service delivery and provides recommendations on how 
to strengthen service provision and governance. The report also identifies the challenges 
faced by international development partners in countries with security issues (See also DAC 
2008b).  
Carment et al. (2008) while examining the effects of state fragility on aid allocation explain 
that aid is usually directed towards states on the basis of their capacity and authority and not 
on the basis of their legitimacy. Ehrenfeld et al. (2003) explain that the potential of aid 
conditionality to positively influence peace processes depends on successful coordination 
among donors, understanding of political situation, willingness to act on threats, and suitable 
rewards and pledges to enhance credibility (See also Boyce 2002, Goodhand and Sedra 
2007). Suhrke and Buckmaster (2005) discuss the patterns and purposes of post-war aid. 
Hansen and Borchgrevink (2006) highlight the intentions and effectiveness of aid sanctions 
and provide analysis on cutting aid to promote peace and democracy. Svensson (2002) 
explains that expectation of aid in the future may increase rent dissipation and reduce the 
public goods provision. There seems to be no existence of donors systematically allocating 
aid to countries with less corruption. Alesina and Weder (1999) show that according to some 
measure of corruption, more corrupt governments are receiving more aid and there is no 
evidence that an increase in aid reduces corruption.  
Aid flows in Pakistan have suffered from unpredictability in turn affecting the country’s 
development plans as well as ongoing projects. The per-capita aid flows on average have 
increased between 1960 and 2006. However as shown in Figure 2 these flows followed sharp 
spikes which made foreign financing an unreliable option for growth over the longer term.  
There is some evidence that Pakistan’s dependence on aid has decreased overtime. Figure 3 
exhibits the declining aid receipts as percentage of GNI.  
 
Figure 2 Net ODA
 
 
Figure 3 Aid Received 
 
Table 
Years Pakistan India Bangladesh
1960's 7.6 2.0 
1970's 7.7 1.8 
1980's 10.3 2.4 
1990's 8.6 2.0 
2000-07 11.0 1.2 
Source: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/qwids 
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 Received Per Capita (Current US $) 
as Percentage of GNI (1960 – 2006) 
 
9 Net ODA received Per- capita  
 Sri Lanka Indonesia Afghanistan
- 2.2 1.4 3.3 
7.7 10.5 4.6 4.9 
13.7 30.5 6.3 3.0 
12.0 31.3 8.2 11.9 
8.4 30.0 6.4 65.1 
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Table 10 Aid as percentage of GNI  
Years Pakistan India Bangladesh Sri Lanka Indonesia Afghanistan Nepal 
1960's 7.0 2.2 - 1.4 4.0 3.0 1.2 
1970's 4.4 1.2 6.1 4.9 2.9 2.6 3.8 
1980's 2.9 0.8 6.4 8.5 1.2 0.8 15.8 
1990's 1.9 0.6 4.1 5.2 1.2 - - 
2000-07 1.7 0.2 2.2 2.7 0.6 32.6 16.9 
Source: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/qwids 
 
The argument of Pakistan receiving less aid in comparison with other economies currently 
facing security threat is strengthened if per-capita aid receipts are taken into account. Recent 
statistics indicate that regionally Afghanistan remains the highest recipient in terms of per-
capita receipts of aid followed by Sri Lanka.  Similarly in terms of aid as percentage of GNI 
Afghanistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka were the leading recipient.  
According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database total number of civilians 
killed during terrorist violence in Pakistan during 2003 to 2010 was around 8597. During the 
same period the number of security forces personnel killed was 3141. Being a major partner 
in the war against terror Pakistan’s military forces killed 18100 terrorists. The total number of 
suicide attacks during 2007 and 2009 was around 197 which took the lives of 735 civilians 
and 196 security forces personnel. This loss of life, destruction of infrastructure and uncertain 
business environmental has collectively resulted in an economic loss of $43 billion between 
2005 and 2010 (Table 11). 
 
Table 11 Damage to Pakistan Economy (Rs. Billion) 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 2005-10 
Direct Costs 67 78 83 109 114 262 712 
Indirect 
Costs 
192 223 278 376 564 707 2340 
Total 259 301 361 484 678 969 3052 
Cost in $ 
billion 
4.4 5.0 6.0 7.7 8.6 11.5 43.2 
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 
 
The leakage of domestic output still remains unaccounted. Due to the porous borders and 
unrest in the neighbouring region with Afghanistan, substantial amount of agricultural items 
are illegally transported into Afghanistan which in turn makes Pakistan food insecure. This 
has in the short term led to sharp spikes in food prices. After 2005 industrial items such as 
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cement and steel were being transported to CIS countries via Afghanistan, ultimately 
escalating construction costs in Pakistan. Same was true for fertilizer upon which Pakistan 
had allowed a subsidy however it was priced much higher in CIS market. The price 
differential prompted smuggling of fertilizer to across the border. The food insecurity has led 
Pakistan to repeatedly resort to food aid. Table 12 indicates the unprecedented increase in 
food aid during 1980s and 1990s. 
 
Table 12 Decade-wise Food and Non-Food Aid 
 
Period Non-food aid Food aid 
1960's 127 134 
1070's 167 92 
1980's 207 157 
1990's 145 321 
2000-09 26 27 
            Source: Economic Affairs Division 
 
 
Pakistan’s involvement in anti-terror efforts also led to unemployment in regions which were 
already suffering economic slump. This not only increased rural poverty but also forced 
internal migration. In only Swat district around 2 million people have been displaced, 
education of youth disrupted, economic infrastructure hampered, and the supply of items such 
as marble, furniture, gems and jewellery, fruits and vegetables has been affected.   
 
While conflict has substantially damaged infrastructure and added to business costs, reduced 
economic growth has also led to sharp challenges of debt servicing.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 shows how debt servicing as percentage of exports increased after 2008 when the 
military operations in northern areas were coupled with budget and BOP crises. 
 
 
 
Figure 
 
 
The nature of war-related damage 
Pakistan it has cost the loss of established socio
While there has been increased hype about pushing donors to do more in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan still awaits the fulfilment of promised pledges. 
spent $22 billion in Afghanistan and $42 billion in Iraq on aid and reconstruction (Tellis 
2008). Since 2002 United States provided Pakistan $12.3 billion out of which less than 27 
percent has gone towards development and economic assis
bilateral aid disbursed to a sample of countries along with the share of US in the global 
bilateral aid.  
Whether or not aid has contributed towards rent seeking behaviour in 
further evaluated. It has been argued by the civil society that aid was one of the factors that 
help military regimes become stronger
military regimes in Pakistan received much higher inflows in comparison to the civil
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Table 13 Aid inflows during Various Political Regimes 
 
Regime From To Per-capita Aid (Current US $) 
Aid 
Received % 
of GNI 
 
Total Aid 
$ Million 
Ayub Khan (Military) 1958 1969 7.6 7.0 5715 
Yahya Khan (Military) 1969 1971 6.4 3.9 1770 
Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto  
(Civil) 1971 1977 7.5 4.7 4861 
Zia-ul-Haq (Military) 1977 1988 9.5 3.0 14792 
From 1988 to 1998 (Civil) 1988 1990 9.4 2.2 24829 
Pervaiz Musharraf 
(Military) 1999 2007 10.3 1.7 21895 
 
3. Macro – Micro Impact of Foreign Resources 
 
The role of foreign savings have been instrumental in leveraging short term growth in 
Pakistan during the post 9/11 period. Using a linked Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
– microsimulation model4 based on 2002 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) we show that a 50 
percent increase in foreign savings leads to an increase in real private consumption by 2.8 
percent. Given the greater amount of foreign exchange available, imports increase by 3.7 
percent, however exports decline by 6.5 percent. The declining exports indicate deterioration 
in trade balance. We can observe that trade deficit as percent of nominal GDP increases by 
1.8 percent. In nominal terms the foreign savings to GDP ratio increased by 2 percent while 
the investment and private savings to GDP decline by 0.3 and 2.4 percent respectively5.  
These results if seen in the light of economic theory, suggest that foreign savings can 
significantly alter the real exchange rate that in turn causes the trade balance to change. This 
                                                            
4
 For complete mathematical details see Ahmed and O’ Donoghue (2010b).  
5
 This section draws from Ahmed and O’ Donoghue (2010c).  
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also implies that production of domestically consumed goods will alter. This happens in our 
results because, absorption, which is defined as the total domestic spending on a good 
calculated at the prices paid by the domestic demanders increases by 2.2 percent in real 
terms. This increase to some extent is made possible through the domestic (non-tradable) 
price index which is decreasing.  
The value-added prices in our simulation decline mostly for tradable goods. The sectors 
showing the highest decline are; leather (10 percent), cotton lint / yarn (7.1 percent) and 
manufacturing (6.9 percent). The prices of several large sectors show an increase such as 
livestock, wheat milling, housing and private services. These are mostly non-tradable sectors. 
The direction of change is similar for the case of output prices, however the magnitude of 
these changes is much smaller given the inclusion of other factors in output prices. Such a 
change seems pro-poor given that the prices of food and oil show a decline. However the 
price of housing increases by 6.9 percent in case of value added price and 5.5 percent in case 
of output price. The decreased prices of cotton and textile also indicate towards increasing 
export competitiveness, however we know from macroeconomic results above, that the 
overall exports did not increase because of an exchange rate appreciation. 
The returns for labour with farm holding and returns for land decline. The return to capital 
does not change. Those who gain under this change are agricultural wage labour and non-
agricultural unskilled wage labour, whose wages increase by 1.5 and 0.5 respectively. It is 
broadly recognized that agricultural wage workers are regarded as the poorest of the rural 
poor (ILO 1996). The overall agriculture incomes are the second most important source, with 
almost 27 percent of total per capita household income (see Adams 1995). According to the 
Labour Force Survey around 44 percent of the employed persons (10 years age and above) 
are working in the agriculture, forestry and fishing sectors. Given this statistics it seems that 
our simulation results indicate redistribution with-in the agriculture sector, where the returns 
for farm owners are declining, and the wages for employed labour in agriculture is increasing. 
The increase in the wages of non-agricultural unskilled labour also indicates a change in 
favour of urban poor.  
The return to land declines for all land classifications in the model. The returns for non-
irrigated land decline more than the irrigated land, and with in the later the decline is greater 
for large and medium farms in Punjab province.  
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For evaluating the changes in the welfare we first see how household incomes change for our 
experiments. We can observe that the change mimics what we have seen for changes in factor 
returns. When foreign savings increase, large or medium farms are the main losers, while all 
other household groups gain, most notably rural agricultural workers who are landless and 
small farm owners. We had explained above that this also represents redistribution in favour 
of low income households. Household consumption however increases for all groups. The 
increase is greater for rural workers.  
In line with the household welfare impact explained above, poverty decreases by 3.1 percent 
when foreign savings increase by 50 percent. Poverty gap and severity both show a decline. 
Poverty decreases in all provinces with Punjab having the highest decline by almost 3.3 
percent followed by Sindh (2.8 percent). The inequality as measured by Gini coefficient 
declines by 0.3 percent.  
 
4. Aid Effectiveness in Pakistan 
 
The fundamental notion behind the usage of aid facility should be ownership of development 
agenda and preferably home grown policies that are envisaged by the recipients of aid in 
alignment with national strategies. The delivery of aid requires transparency and 
effectiveness of national institutions, starting from the federal tier to the local or municipality 
level. Having a constant eye on results and outcomes requires continuous reiteration of 
development goals at all levels of public sector and civil society. The development 
parameters should be coordinated and synchronized in order to keep aid flows tractable. The 
predictability of aid should be accompanied with untied arrangements and finally overarching 
development agenda of the country should be augmented through appropriate real sector and 
external account policies.  
Most recent aid inflows for Pakistan are associated with geo-political, law and order situation 
inside the country and the neighbouring region with Afghanistan. The security concern of 
donors however has hampered future aid flows to Pakistan particularly in long term 
infrastructure projects. The volatility of assistance in turn results in delayed disbursements, 
project closures, shifting of aid portfolio from budgetary support to project aid. 
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The development budget of 2007 indicated 17% foreign funding. It is estimated that only one 
third external assistance appears in the budgetary record and forms a part of Public Sector 
Development Programme (PSDP). The optimal absorption of these foreign resources largely 
depends upon the implementation capacity of federal, provincial and local governments. 
Donors have at times argued about the duplicity of development policy documents being 
issued by various government institutions. Apart from the main development dossiers such as 
medium term plans by Planning Commission, the federal ministries also have their own 
policy document such as Annual Trade Policy developed by Ministry of Commerce, Textile 
Policy designed by Ministry of Textile, Investment Policy given by Board of Investment and 
National Education, Health and Social Sector Policies designed by relevant ministries. This 
fragmented policymaking makes the development implementation task all the more difficult 
for stakeholders and leaves foreign assistance misaligned.  
The challenge of coordinating fragmented assistance in Pakistan is more difficult in sectors 
such as governance, education, health & nutrition, gender and environment which are 
receiving aid for small projects from a large number of donors.  The donors should fast come 
to conclusion about a manageable scale of program and the manner in which delivery of aid 
is kept strongly grounded in Paris Declaration Agenda. An understanding is also necessary 
regarding how much of assistance should be managed in a decentralized fashion. The 
Development Assistance Database (DAD) for 2006 indicates 20 donors who have been 
regular in assisting Pakistan in recent past. Around five donors which include ADB, WB, 
Japan, China and US are providing 90% of annual disbursement. These donors need to 
connect with each other on a more regular basis in order to ensure absorption of disbursed 
aid. The country representatives of most of the donors are still far from the principles of Paris 
Declaration being advocated in their top hierarchy. 
The coordination between domestic institutions suffers due to lack of clarity regarding rules 
and responsibility of various authorities. The Paris Declaration survey 2006 had revealed 
small portion of coordinated technical cooperation. At the government level careful attention 
should be given to formulation of aid policy, which should define the provision, allocation 
and coordination of aid. The aid policy once formulated should be able to ensure compliance 
with conditionalities. The Economic Affairs Division (EAD) working under the Ministry of 
Finance should also streamline internal procedures in order to ensure the aid effectiveness in 
line with international best practices. The policy should also streamline a plan for systematic 
dialogue between donors at various levels of government (currently three federal ministries 
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deal with disbursement of foreign aid). At the national level, Pakistan Development Forum 
(PDF) provided opportunity where donors may have detailed sectoral dialogue with recipient 
institutions. However the inconclusive discussions at PDF indicate the need to restructure this 
forum and make it more focused towards information sharing dialogue on crosscutting 
themes and impediments in aid implementation. The establishment of the new consortium led 
by US, Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FoDP) resulted in discontinuation of PDF. However 
reduced FoDP inflows have prompted the donors to demand a revival of PDF.  
Malik (2009) splits the analysis of quality and coordination of ODA in three main areas of 
concern namely: a) composition of aid, b) fragmentation of aid and c) aid volatility. Taking 
lead from Easterly and Pfutze (2008) to highlight that some form of aid and technical 
assistance may be less effective than others, the author emphasizes the important role of aid-
mix in determining flexibility of resources. There is limited need assessment, insufficient 
local efficiency and communication in design of technical cooperation and not much attention 
is given to follow up phase which should ideally ensure proper monitoring. Past experience 
suggests that China (whose aid accounted for 66 percent of total aid commitments in 
Pakistan) during 2001-2007 and non DAC donors do not participate in aid coordination 
forums. 
The issue of aid fragmentation is most seen in social sector such as governance and 
education. The higher transaction costs attributed to increased fragmentation take the form of 
time and money spent on compliance and coordination. Rabia (2005) shows for education 
sector that aid since 1999 has come from numerous donors in small quantities. However, it 
becomes difficult to assess the donor influence due to lack of consistent data on performance 
indicators.  
The volatility of aid poses problems that include poor planning , increased number of short 
term projects, discontinuity of projects and cash flow issues with existing projects. The 
volatility of assistance has led to a large size of throw forward (public sector projects which 
stand approved but now lack liquidity). The current PSDP throw forward liability has 
exceeded Rs 3 trillion. OECD DAC data shows that between 2000 to 2006 Pakistan faced 
35% more volatility as compared to an average recipient. The variation in aid  composition 
accounted for 70% of overall volatility during 1997 to 2006. Around 76 % of volatility in 
grants during 1998 to 2007 originated from the grants provided by US. The unpredicted aid 
has translated into assistance falling short of the committed amount on occasions. Around 20 
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% of ODA disbursed has never been released and 50% of donors disbursed less than the 
committed amount (Malik 2009). 
The sources of aid volatility in Pakistan include limited implementation capacity, changing 
donor priorities and geopolitical conditions. The short term orientation of aid flows has 
contributed toward unsustainability of development. Around 45% projects which carry 34% 
of disbursement were of 3 years duration or less. 
Pakistan participated in the Paris Declaration monitoring survey 2006, however it did not 
participate in the next round as the exercise coincided with the election cycle and shifts in 
development priorities. We may summarize here the results from 2006 survey6.  
• Around 88 percent of total ODA disbursed by the government sector was recorded in 
the government system.  
• Out of the total ODA provided for technical cooperation in 2005, only 28% was 
disbursed in support of coordinated capacity development programmes.  
• During 2005, 76% of ODA was disbursed by using the public financial management 
system of the Government. The Government has set up a multi-donor working group  
to look at improving harmonization of donor financial management and procurement 
systems, and increasing the alignment and use of the Government procedures.  
• Out of the total ODA disbursed in 2005, 68% was disbursed by using the national 
procurement systems.  In total, 7 out of 16 donors used the national procurement 
systems. However, only three of them (WB, ADB, USAID) account together for 97% 
of the total ODA disbursed by using national procurement systems. The vast majority 
of donors disbursed none or very small amounts of ODA by using the national 
procurement systems. 
• Out of the ODA disbursements planned for 2005, 83% was recorded as actually 
disbursed by the government. While overall predictability, according to the measure 
used in the survey, seems to be high, government’s experience suggests that in-year 
predictability of disbursements is rather low. At the time when the corresponding 
commitment is made, many donors do not indicate when (e.g. in which quarter) the 
disbursement is planned. 
• In 2005, 31% of the total ODA was disbursed in support of initiatives adopting 
programme-based approaches. The majority of the funding disbursed through 
programme-based approaches was disbursed as budget support (84%). There is very 
little use of programme based approaches outside of direct budget support. Out of 16 
donors, WB accounts for 82% of the total ODA disbursed in support of programme-
based approaches. 
                                                            
6
 This draws from material provided to us by Economic Affairs Division.  
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• The proportion of joint missions and joint analytical work is relatively low at 12% and 
41% respectively. Coordinated missions and analytical work are still only conducted 
on an ad-hoc basis. 
5. Pakistan-Specific Case Studies in Aid Effectiveness 
 
In this section we discuss briefly the key aid experiences of Pakistan under specific 
programmes. In 1954 with the revamping of individual country program under Foreign Aid 
Bill, US stepped up aid for Pakistan which continued until mid 1960s. The war of 1965 
between India and Pakistan meant that US administration wanted to impose statutory curbs 
on both countries – a move later vetoed in Congress. A similar action was initiated against 
Pakistan during civil war of 1971 which called for banning US economic and military aid to 
Pakistan (Kole 1971).  
By end 1970s as the Soviet Union flexed its strength in Afghanistan, US came forward with a 
series of aid packages for  Pakistan which formally started in 1981 and lasted for most part of 
the military regime in 1980s. After the breakup of Soviet Union, US aid to Pakistan sharply 
diminished and 1990s saw Pakistan relying on non-concessional sources even to cover its 
past debt accumulated during the Afghan war period. This implied a movement away from 
bilateral sources of aid towards multi-donor programmes.   
The Social Action Programme mainly designed and initiated by WB in Pakistan in 1992 was 
aimed at improving human development status and improving socio – economic indicators in 
Pakistan. Initially the programme’s focus was through primary health services, education 
sector, population welfare, rural water supply and sanitation aimed to augment the quality 
and quantity of investment in social services (DFID 2000). The government in partnership 
with donors agreed to raise spending, improve sectoral policies and make efforts toward 
removing initial constraints. Despite making progress in growth and investment not much 
achievement was seen in human development sphere during 1990’s. Among the lapses 
indentified in optimal utilization of programme, predicaments included: inefficient resource 
allocation, poor design of social services, non-optimal utilization which was in part due to 
institutional weakness. 
 In various donor evaluations these difficulties had been attributed to lack of ownership at 
both political and bureaucratic level. Furthermore the federal administrative structure of 
country implied that revenues and fund were been generated at the federal tier and social 
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sectors were been managed by provinces. This not only made the process of implementation 
more challenging but also required the high level of commitment at both tiers. 
From the outset this programme was being considered as WB dominated program, which not 
only implied the government following the WB style implementation but also meant that 
other donors did not come forward in a truly coordinated manner for financing the same or 
similar projects. Provincial government had to go through mundane monitoring processes, 
where little attention was been paid to overarching theme of social reforms. By 1997 after a 
review of first phase, WB shifted entire management of Social Action Programme to Pakistan 
for initiation of second phase. Only this time WB agreed on a more participatory approach 
among all stakeholders. In DFID (2000) it was again emphasised that WB only held limited 
engagements.  
In its country assistance evaluation (2006) WB highlighted the manner in which bank’s 
assistance strategy was changed overtime. By1998 when focus of the strategy was completely 
on service delivery through vehicle of Social Action Programme, targeted programmes were 
introduced for social protection and it was during this phase when Pakistan Poverty 
Alleviation Fund (PPAF) was created in 1999 to facilitate in the provision of micro credit and 
small scale community infrastructure. However 2001 country assistance strategy progress 
report informed that the program outcome fell short of targets and despite significant 
investment from government and donors, social sector indicators exhibited dismal 
performance. In education, particularly primary education, poor governance was held 
responsible which in turn was an outcome of financial mismanagement and lack of 
accountability at teacher’s level. In health sector the resistance to mobilize NGO’s was 
termed as the main cause of weak result.  
At this stage the government adopted new reform program focused on expanding devolution 
process. It was envisaged that accountability at the local level will improve service delivery. 
In order to address the gender issues raised by the civil society while increasing the number 
of seats and capacity building programmes for women parliamentarians, government with 
support of donors also expanded at the micro level, lady health workers program and 
conditional cash transfers to female students in primary schoolings. 
Three years into the devolution program WB, ADB and DFID published a joint report in 
2004 that focused on six districts and found evidence of change where citizens reported that 
their voices were now being heard at the administrative levels. Recommendations for further 
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improvement emphasised incentives for efficiency, local accountability and efforts to 
gradually change existing practices and attitudes. For the overall decentralization process, 
Keefer et al. (2005) suggested embedding of decentralization in the national constitution and 
improving voter information regarding actions of local officials. The process of political 
decentralization was supposed to follow fiscal decentralization. However with the return of 
civilian rule in 2007-08 the new government in a bid to strengthen federal and provincial tiers 
abolished the local governments - a move which was resented by civil society and smaller 
political parties. 
The aid experiences in Pakistan will be incomplete without the mention of rural support 
programs. The Aga Khan Rural Support Program (AKRSP) operational in northern Pakistan 
since 1982 provides an example of private development agencies working towards 
community – driven participatory rural development through indigenous self-help projects. 
The aim was to facilitate venture capital for rural enterprise however the pre-requisites 
required a process of village organization. The villagers should choose leaders, set priorities 
and select fellow villagers to lead various teams focusing on economic and social ventures. In 
this process the villagers learn to create a consensus amongst themselves and to keep the new 
infrastructure maintained (see De Spoelberch and Shaw 1987, Padawangi 2010).  
Inspired by the AKRSP model, the government in 1992 launched a nation-wide National 
Rural Support Program (NRSP). An important feature of scaling-up of rural support 
programmes (RSPs) was that these were created as independent non-profit bodies. This 
implied that these RSPs would remain insulated from political and bureaucratic interference. 
At the initial stages of RSPs the main commitment came from Aga Khan Foundation, 
Canadian and UK governments however at later stages federal government became the 
leading resource provider (Malik 2009). Another important contribution of Aga Khan 
Foundation along with Orangi Pilot Project in Karachi was the initiation of microfinance 
movement in Pakistan which ultimately became the main objective of establishing PPAF (see 
Shah 2009 and Muhammad 2010).  
The PPAF largely focuses on enterprise development, water and community infrastructure, 
education and health. The government receives a soft loan from donors and forwards it to 
PPAF under even softer terms. The PPAF then identifies non-governmental organizations or 
other civil society arrangements amongst whom it disburses the funds. Currently this fund has 
the largest support from the WB. While discussing possible implications for aid 
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fragmentation, Malik (2009) argues that PPAF model reduces duplication of programs and 
internalizes the aid arrangement with multiple donors.   
Another recent aid experience of Pakistan originates from the 2005 earthquake when almost 
73500 people were killed. The aftermath of the earthquake also saw 128000 people with 
injuries and requiring immediate rehabilitation. Almost 3.3 million people had lost their 
homes and now required shelter and food. In terms of physical infrastructure the loss 
included 600000 houses, 6400 km of road network, 6298 schools, 350 health facilities, 3994 
water supply lines, and 949 public sector buildings. MacLeod (2006) indicates the success of 
early recovery programme due to a cluster approach that allowed military and civilian efforts 
backed by donor community to focus on: protecting most vulnerable, restoring capacities, 
rebuild livelihoods, secure human development gains, reduce disaster risk, engage private 
sector, promote self-sufficiency, ensure transparency and accountability, and remain 
coordinated at all levels of operations.  
While documenting the history of aid in Pakistan, one has to also evaluate the impact of 
assistance for Afghan refugees. Hilali (2002) explains that Afghan war had detrimental 
impact on internal and external security of Pakistan. After Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979 Pakistan saw a record influx of refugees entering its border. The refugee settlements 
created political, economic, social, environmental and ecological problems for Pakistan. In 
various areas of Pakistan the refugees destroyed ecological balance, causing desertification 
and soil erosion and promoted drug trafficking, Kalashnikov culture, sectarianism, and law 
and order problems that still persist. The author also explains how the Afghan war corrupted 
Pakistani elites and provided political legitimacy to military rule and dictatorship in the 
country (see also Ibrahim 2010). Figure 5 indicates how assistance to Pakistan towards 
Afghan relief the declined pre-maturely. During mid and late 1990s when Pakistan was host 
to the highest number of refugees in the world, Afghan assistance was at its lowest.  
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Figure 5 Aid Towards Afghan Relief 
 
 
 
 
6. Priorities for Aid Policy Reform in Pakistan 
 
a. Paris Declaration and Aid Policy Framework 
In September of 2008 representatives from developing and developed countries met in Accra, 
Ghana to reinforce the commitments towards aid effectiveness in Paris Declaration. It was 
realised that real progress has been made towards improving lives of those under extreme 
poverty however rising commodity prices now posed a greater challenge if countries are to 
successfully accomplish MDGs. According to the 2008 Paris Declaration survey, developing 
countries had started to improve management of public funds and donors were now working 
in a more coordinated manner. The World leaders in Accra established consensus towards 
three main factors that can play a vital role in improving aid effectiveness.  
First the strengthening of country ownership over development should take the form of 
deepening country-level policy dialogue on development, expanding the capacity of 
developing countries to lead and manage development processes and using the institutions 
and systems available in developing countries to a maximum extent possible for improved 
service delivery.  
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Second in order to build more effective and inclusive partnerships for development there is a 
need to reduce costly fragmentation of aid, increase aid’s value for money, encourage a broad 
base of developing actors in recipient countries, deepen engagement with civil society 
organizations, and adapt aid policies for countries in fragile situations.  
Third in order to move fast towards improved delivery and accounting for development 
results there is a need to develop information systems which in turn should help in 
strengthening the quality of policy design. Cost-effective results management is important to 
assess impact of developing policies. Donors need to align their monitoring with country 
information systems and incentives to improve aid effectiveness should be strengthened. In 
order to make aid more transparent there still remains a need to make further improvements 
to public financial management and to further support ownership the nature of conditionality 
should be reformed. Finally greater predictability in aid flows is imperative so that 
developing countries are in a position to manage their own development strategies.  
Pakistan in its draft Foreign Assistance Policy Framework7 reinforces strengthened 
collaboration of all development actors in line with principles outlined in Paris Declaration. 
The two basic principles governing the policy framework include: ensuring compatibility and 
convergence of foreign – aided development with national plans and improve quality, 
effectiveness and efficiency of foreign assistance. The policy is based on principles of 
national ownership, alignment of national priorities, harmonization with national systems and 
procedures, results-oriented monitoring and evaluation, inclusive dialogue and information 
sharing.  
The national budget streamlines the development priorities in the country. The draft policy 
therefore prefers budgetary support over other forms of assistance. This is intended to 
strengthen institutional capacity, reduce transaction costs, improve coordination, and make 
disbursement and delivery more flexible. The government will further prefer unearmarked 
funding in order to avoid distortion in allocation of funds. Earmarking by donors reduces 
government’s role in establishing development priorities. The budget support should also be 
complemented with technical assistance in order to ensure results in line with best practices. 
In various evaluations project assistance was not found sustainable after a certain period. In 
order not to see this in future, project assistance should ideally be integrated into 
programmatic approaches and implemented through national institutional arrangements.  
                                                            
7
 Currently at consultative stage in Economic Affairs Division.  
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In order not to further add to the debt burden, government will prefer grants and concessional 
(soft) loans. The later will only be used where future cash flow is expected and pursuit of 
economic growth is helped. Loan assistance will be considered for infrastructure 
development and venues that help foreign exchange earnings. The feasibility study 
component of loan based programmes will be completed through grants which in turn will 
mean minimal expenditure on foreign consultants. The aid provided should be untied 
however goods and services equivalent to a certain proportion of total financial volume may 
be allowed if some specific project requires niche technology or expertise. Even in case of 
technical assistance (which should ideally be financed through grants) tying with source or 
origin of financial assistance will not be desired.  
While maintaining the independence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) the 
government believes in sharing of information regarding funds and activities so that no 
duplication takes place at the national level. The government will work closely with NGOs in 
developing standard codes for NGO transparency and accountability.  
A proper division of labour mechanism among development partners should be established in 
future. In order to avoid excessive fragmentation the government will aim to ask donors to 
work in thematic areas outside of which all donors should support that development partner 
which is already active in other areas.  
The proposals for financial assistance should follow aid prioritization criteria that includes: 
conformity with fiscal responsibility and debt limitation law, complimenting domestic 
budgetary resources outlined in national plans, contribution towards achievement of regional 
balance by targeting underdeveloped areas.  
 
b. Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FoDP) 
Pakistan Development Forum (PDF) has served as a dialogue forum between various 
development partners. The forum allowed the donors to interact with the officials managing 
various socio-economic sectors in Pakistan. In the wake of heightened war in the region 
neighbouring with Afghaistan and a military operation that lasted for several months 
followed by terror strikes in various cities, US helped in forming a consortium of countries 
and organizations willing to assist Pakistan in successfully winning the war on terror and 
reconstruction of war torn areas. The FoDP that has already met twice has asked Pakistan to 
make further efforts in eradicating terror elements inside its borders and plans to tie aid 
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programme for Pakistan with security efforts. Many donors believe that this demand from the 
developed world may take a lot more time than currently being envisaged. Hence many are of 
the view that replacing PDF with FoDP was a mistake and has disrupted the previous 
mechanism of structured dialogue.  
Pakistan’s present dialogue with donors under FoDP focuses on: a) security, b) socio-
economic recovery, c) medium term development programme, d) integrated energy 
development, and e) institution building. The precise summary of proposals for the FoDP 
meeting in Tokyo focused on: a) food security, b) reducing cost of doing business in 
Pakistan, c) poverty alleviation, empowerment and employment and d) FATA people 
empowerment.  
In food security cluster, assistance is desired for: a) water management and development and 
b) development of agricultural resources on cost efficient lines. The proposed projects under 
water sector include the construction of Bhasha-Diamer dam, rehabilitation of irrigation 
infrastructure and 32 small dams. In agriculture sector proposed projects include the 
increasing of post-harvest efficiency, productivity enhancement, value addition and 
institutional development.  
In order to reduce the cost of doing business three specific sectors need attention. First, 
transport and communication sector will involve maintenance and development of roads, rail 
network and ports that can reduce the travel time and cost for merchandise goods and in turn 
increase the competitiveness of Pakistani goods. The mineral development strategy will focus 
on marble, granite and onyx value chain, iodized table salt plant, and creating a quarry 
machine tool.  
Projects focusing on poverty alleviation, empowerment and employment have been split into 
four main areas: a) health and population, b) education, c) safety net for the vulnerable, and 
d) skills development and employment.  
Under the health, education and livelihood cluster proposed projects are aimed at: programme 
for access to health services, girls secondary school education, safety net for vulnerable 
(which has also translated in to Rs. 70 million worth Benazir Income Support Programme), 
skills development, national employment programme and population welfare.  
The ongoing energy crisis has meant rising costs for businesses and electricity shortages for 
both industry and household sector. The SME sector in Pakistan has been the worst hit due to 
unannounced electricity and gas stoppages. Three projects proposed in the Abu Dhabi 
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meeting with FoDP included: Thar Coal development project, Bunji hydro power plant and 
Guddu thermal power. The total cost of developing these projects stands at $8.5 billion in 
2009 prices.  
A lot of focus in future will be towards the rehabilitation of internally displaced persons 
(IDPs). Pakistan faced two accounts of forced internal migration namely: a) earthquake of 
2005, b) war operations in northern parts of the country that started in 2007. According to 
2009 estimates 310,000 people had migrated from their homes. In 12 relief camps 
approximately 61180 IDPs were residing8, 38750 houses had been destroyed9. The daily 
expenditure per capita on food and shelter-related facilities was around US$1.9. One of the 
key proposals include empowerment of people in federally administered tribal area (FATA) 
of Pakistan who were displaced the most. A comprehensive package is required in the region 
that focuses on providing education, health, food security and infrastructure (including 
energy) to the people of this region. For social empowerment of people in this region the 
government proposes scholarships for FATA students, provision of missing facilities in 
schools, establishing FATA Institute of Medical Sciences and establishing Institute of 
Engineering and Technology.  
The socio economic revival and sustained growth will require help from FoDP on mitigating 
cost of war on terror, market access and economic cooperation, securitization and debt swaps, 
and the establishment of proposed FATA Pakistan Trust Fund.  
Pakistan is seeking market access and expanded economic cooperation with US, EU and 
Japan. With the US, plans focus on Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) for FATA, 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, earthquake affected areas and Baluchistan. Appropriate 
amendments should be made in rules of origin to maximize gains for these zones. Pakistan 
for a limited period should be allowed unilateral tariff concessions for exports particularly of 
textiles and garments sector. There should be early finalization of bilateral investment treaty 
and there should be firm commitment to initiate FTA negotiations.  In case of EU, Pakistan is 
seeking inclusion in GSP+ scheme and initiation of FTA negotiations. In South Asia, EU has 
already initiated talks with India towards FTA arrangement. With Japan, Pakistan wishes 
increased market access for its agricultural commodities and an initiation of early negotiation 
on FTA.  
                                                            
8
 Others were forced to find residence with friends and relative in other areas of Pakistan.  
9
 Approximate cost of repair is Rs 500000 per house.  
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The FoDP have also been asked to enter into debt swap arrangements to ease the debt burden 
of Pakistan. The main item in this arrangement is Paris Club debt which amounted to almost 
$10.8 billion in 2009. A deferred oil facility has been requested from Saudi Arabia and UAE. 
Pakistan has suggested the establishment of a multidonor trust fund to administer the 
development in FATA, Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and AJK.  
The fundamental assumption behind productivity-led growth is security of assets and profits. 
Pakistan requires financial and technical assistance to substantially raise a trained police force 
in all four provinces. There is a need to provide the police force with forensic and 
surveillance equipment in order to improve their tracking ability. Women police units in 
every police station (1200 in number) of Pakistan are desired. These should be autonomous 
and staffed by female employees.  
The institution building cluster comprises of three main sub-sectors: e-governance, human 
resource development, gender empowerment and partnering with institutions. In case of e-
governance the focus should be on e-administration (computerization of urban and rural 
property records, systems and procedures), e-justice (computerization of judicial records) and 
e-security (computerization of records of law enforcement agencies). A key project towards 
improved gender empowerment and HRD is the nursing sector initiative. Emphasis will be on 
strengthening the quality and increasing quantity of nurses in Pakistan in order to produce a 
targeted number of nurses to meet both the domestic and international demand.  
Pakistan also proposes strategies for partnering with institutions in FoDP countries. Potential 
ways to collaborate include: ‘adopt’ an organization, public private partnership, exchange 
programs, sponsorship schemes, technology transfer and endowment programs. Two 
potential partnering arrangements may be with Alternate Energy Development Board and 
Pakistan Agriculture Research Council.  
As a result of proposals submitted to FoDP it is estimated that immediate incremental 
increase in GDP will be around $8 billion with an increase in employment of around 5.74 
million labour. However it is disappointing to note that after the first two meetings, FoDP had 
pledged $2.2 billion, which was later slashed to $874 million. By April 2010, Pakistan had 
only received $251 million (excluding $325 received from Islamic Development Bank). The 
contributors were Saudi Arabia, US and EU. The US also released the payment towards 
Coalition Support Fund after considerable delay.  
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c. Kerry – Lugar Programme for Pakistan 
The interests of US that revived in Pakistan after 9/11 incident have translated more recently 
into expanded USAID programs. The assistance has focused on education, health and 
technical cooperation. The Kerry – Lugar act 2010 aims to provide an annual $1.5 billion 
civilian aid to Pakistan for the next five years. The advocates called this bill a move to rebuild 
trust with a critical ally. 
The new US administration in 2009 framed its thinking in the new USAID Country 
Assistance Strategy for Pakistan (2010-14). It is realised that in order to meet Pakistan’s 
development needs, assistance should flow from the public and private sector of US in high 
impact projects that focus on energy, agriculture, education and health. In order to sustain 
these investments, complimentary efforts should be undertaken to strengthen the human, 
financial, and institutional capacity. The funding mechanisms will be such that support for 
infrastructure projects will flow to the national government direct as budget support or public 
private partnership. Alongside greater emphasis will be on relationship with Pakistani non-
profit and non-governmental organizations that are working in social sectors.  
The US has formalized its contribution to the FoDP forum in the shape of Kerry Lugar bill 
which was cleared by the United States House of Representatives in September 2009. This 
aid program is a step toward socio-economic development at civilian level population and 
will rejuvenate Pakistan’s institutional capacity, developing tribal areas and encouraging 
multilateral solutions by engaging neighbouring countries such as India and   Afghanistan. 
The program proposed use of NGO rather than government ministries to disburse aid.   
This aid arrangement will make Pakistan second largest recipient of U.S. aid in the world. 
The assistance to be provided to Pakistan will mainly fall under categories10 such as: a) civil 
liberties, b) political rights, c) voice and accountability, d) government effectiveness, e) rule 
of law, f) control of corruption, g) immunization rates, h) public expenditure on health, i) 
girls’ primary education, j) public expenditure on primary education, k) natural resource 
management, l) business start-up, m) land rights and access, n) trade policy, o) regulatory 
quality, and p) fiscal policy management.  
Critics while admitting that long term non-military aid of $ 7.5 billion over the next five 
years is a significant step initiated by US for the socio-economic reforms in the country 
                                                            
10Categories as described in the annual “Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Determining the Eligibility 
of Candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account Assistance” 
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argued that for economic growth in the country increased market access for Pakistani goods 
should have been top on the agenda. The US has again designed a strategy that focuses on 
aid, not trade. The element of distrust between the two nations that originates from US 
leaving Pakistan in the middle of an incomplete development agenda as soon as Soviet Union 
retreated in late 1980s, still explains the apprehensions of people from all walks of life in 
Pakistan towards the Kerry – Lugar assistance (See Ashraf 2009). Paris (2010) states that 
Pakistani opinion is so anti-American that sometimes it is hard to figure out what the US 
should do in Pakistan. Kfir (2009) argues that Kerry – Lugar strategy will not help 
substantially towards improving the socio-economic situation in Pakistan as it ignores the 
core problem in the region i.e. lack of strong democratic institutions. Nawaz (2010) argues 
that the war in Afghanistan could be lost if US doesn’t start helping Islamabad and discusses 
the need for US to help Pakistan in rebuilding its infrastructure that could knit the country 
together and create future employment and investments. The need for establishing education 
centres by US has been stressed for its benefit in terms of upgrading human capital and 
strengthening civil society.  
O’ Hanlon (2010) provides a way forward in promoting regional integration in the region that 
may well provide the much needed economic stability. The author suggests: the early passing 
of bill that proposes free trade between Pakistan’s tribal areas and US, encouraging Pakistan 
and India in passing their own free trade accords, helping Pakistan – Afghanistan transit 
agreement to become a success, building fuel pipelines and electricity lines from Central Asia 
through Afghanistan and into Pakistan.  
 
Table 14 Aid, Loss of Life and Damage to the Economy 
 
 ODA current ($ 
million) 
Aid to Death 
Ratio 
Economic loss ($ 
million) 
Aid to Economic Loss 
ratio 
2002 2136 - - - 
2003 1071 3.5 - - 
2004 1439 1.5 - - 
2005 1607 1.9 4400 0.37 
2006 2140 1.3 5000 0.43 
2007 2244 0.6 6000 0.37 
2008 1539 0.2 7700 0.20 
Source: Data on ODA from WDI, data on number of deaths from SATP database, data on economic loss from Economic 
Survey of Pakistan 2009-10.  
 
It has been repeatedly said that at the start of collective initiatives against global terror, 
coalitions usually are enthusiastic to help smaller partners. However as the war prolongs it is 
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these smaller partners that are left stranded with diminishing assistance. Table 14 indicates 
that this is precisely what happened in Pakistan more recently. The aid to death ratio (i.e. aid 
receipts per person killed) has been declining since 2003. Similarly aid to economic loss ratio 
which was $0.4 million in 2005 had fallen to half in 2008. Pakistan’s war – related assistance 
has been one of the major factor in increased aid from non-DAC donors.  
Figure 6 Major Recipients of Non-DAC Donor Humanitarian Aid 2009 
 
Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Pakistan being a frontline state in the war against terrorism has also remained one of the 
highest recipients of foreign aid. This paper analyses foreign assistance through four main 
facets namely: the link between aid, security and growth with special reference to Pakistan, 
general equilibrium impact of foreign resource inflow on economic growth and poverty, aid 
effectiveness in Pakistan, and priorities for aid policy reform in the country.   
The empirical literature on the impact of aid on economic development in Pakistan is 
inconclusive due to aid being fragmented and volatile. The donors have remained poorly 
coordinated with a weak follow up mechanism. Pakistan for its part has seen mixed 
experiences in aid absorption. While a decade long nation-wide social action program could 
not translate into improved social and welfare indicators, there are some success stories such 
as: rural support networks, microfinance opportunities, cluster approach for earthquake relief 
and recovery.  
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While the economic implications of prolonged reliance on aid indicate Dutch disease effects 
at the macroeconomic level in Pakistan, there are more concerning effects at that micro level 
where society has started to perceive aid as a compensation (and not assistance) for 
Pakistan’s involvement in wars led by developed nations. This behaviour besides corrupting 
the elite also promotes rent seeking where agents gaining from war have a vested interest in 
keep the conflict intensified.   
Pakistan along with its development partners has taken measures to move towards the 
directions indicated in Paris Declaration. The EAD is in the process of finalizing Foreign 
Assistance Policy Framework which is governed by principles that ensure compatibility and 
convergence of aid with national plans and improve quality, effectiveness and efficiency of 
foreign assistance. Having a national aid policy is all the more important at this stage when 
Pakistan is in the process of seeking assistance from the FoDP consortium and Kerry – Lugar 
arrangement with US. The improved mechanism should include appropriate amendments 
based upon the lessons learnt from past experiences.  
Finally as the reconstruction work takes off in the war-torn areas, there will be increased need 
for regular quantitative and qualitative analytical work by both government and donors. The 
research dissemination should then translate in to a process of effective dialogue between all 
stakeholders.   
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9. Annex – I  
 
 
Table 15 Total Bilateral Aid Disbursed ($ Million) 
Recipient(s) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Afghanistan 2303 2818 2956 3965 4865 16907 
Bangladesh 1414 1318 1220 1515 2061 7528 
Bhutan 78 90 102 90 87 447 
China 1716 1814 1248 1487 1489 7754 
India 774 1851 1383 1384 2108 7500 
Indonesia 127 2509 1311 896 1225 6068 
Iraq 4647 22046 8870 9185 9880 54628 
Maldives 28 76 38 37 54 233 
Nepal 425 424 511 609 716 2685 
Pakistan 1439 1607 2140 2244 1539 8969 
Palestinian Adm. Areas 1115 1116 1450 1872 2593 8146 
Philippines 449 567 565 647 61 2289 
Rwanda 490 577 589 722 931 3309 
Sierra Leone 376 340 347 545 367 1975 
Somalia 199 237 391 384 758 1969 
Sri Lanka 506 1155 786 613 730 3790 
Sudan 992 1823 2044 2112 2384 9355 
Turkey 285 396 566 792 2024 4063 
Vietnam 1846 1913 1845 2511 2552 10667 
 
Table 16 Aid Disbursed by United States ($ Million) 
Recipient(s) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Afghanistan 778 1318 1404 1514 2112 7126 
Bangladesh 63 49 42 49 93 296 
India 51 57 97 85 52 342 
Indonesia 69 156 190 117 115 647 
Iraq 3022 11228 4782 3749 2742 25523 
Nepal 35 52 62 54 78 281 
Pakistan 77 323 478 434 351 1663 
Palestinian Adm. Areas 274 181 206 212 491 1364 
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Philippines 79 97 98 85 71 430 
Rwanda 50 57 78 91 117 393 
Sierra Leone 30 22 21 21 16 110 
Somalia 32 37 95 59 243 466 
Sri Lanka -3 59 29 33 52 170 
Sudan 378 759 739 710 848 3434 
Thailand 10 21 25 45 40 141 
Vietnam 30 28 45 41 63 207 
 
